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THE DOG THAT RARELY BARKS:
WHY THE COURTS WON'T RESOLVE
THE WAR POWERS DEBATEt
Jonathan L. Entin tt

There is a certain irony about the stimulating papers by Louis
Fisher and Peter Shane: the political scientist, Fisher, makes a
normative constitutional argument of the sort typically made by
legal scholars; 1 the legal scholar, Shane, makes an institutional and
policy analysis of the sort typically made by political scientists.2
Nevert..heless, these papers share a common theme: that the President does not and should not have unfettered or unilateral power in
the war-making area. Both also focus on war powers rather than
other aspects of foreign affairs such as treaties and executive agreements, but their approaches have implications for those issues as
wel1. 3 The reader will, I hope, forgive me for not providing a
detailed critique of the common theme of these papers and for not

t With apologies to Sherlock Holmes. Cf SIR ARTHUR CONAN DoYLE, Silver Blaze,
in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 349 (1930) ("a dog was kept in the stables,
and yet, though someone had been in and had fetched out a horse, he had not barked
enough to arouse the two lads in the loft").
tt Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Louis Fisher, Sidestepping Congress: Presidents Acting Under the UN and NATO,
47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1237 (1997).
2. Peter M. Shane, Learning McNanw.ra' s Lessons: How the War Powers Resolution
Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1281 (1997).
3. The years since World War ll have seen notable changes in the government's
approach to international agreements. Many such agreements, including those relating to
the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization, were not
approached as treaties subject to ratification by a two-thirds majority of the Senate but
under special procedures requiring only a simple majority in both houses of Congress. For
contrasting evaluations of these developments, compare Bruce Ackerman & David Golove,
Is NAFTA Constitutional? 108 HARv. L. REv. 799 (1995), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constillltional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995).
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exploring some of the larger implications of that theme for. the
making and implementation of foreign policy. 4
Instead, I want to emphasize one particularly striking feature
of both papers: the dearth of references to judicial decisions. Fisher
cites three district court rulings that held the Korean conflict to be
a "war" for purposes of insurance coverage5 and a district court
case on the legality of United States involvement in Operation
Desert Storm without a declaration of war. 6 Shane provides the
almost obligatory reference to Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer1 in a single footnote but cites no other judicial decisions.
The paucity of citations to cases is no accident, and I make
this observation without intending criticism of either author. Instead, I believe that this feature of the papers is instructive, especially for lawyers who have come to think almost reflexively that
the Constitution means only what the Supreme Court says it
means. Indeed, I want to make two principal points relating to this
aspect of the papers: (1) courts are unlikely to play a very large
role in resolving debates over the respective roles of Congress and
the President in matters of war and foreign affairs; and, (2) that is
a good thing.
I.

Let me begin with why the judicial role m this area is likely
to be modest. In doing so, I recognize that the federal
courts-including the Supreme Court-have decided some well-

4. There is a wide range of views about the relative powers of Congress and the
President in the field of war and foreign affairs. See, e.g., JoHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY 48-50, 61-66, 115-38 (1993); GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF PowERS 123-38 (1997); ROBERT F. TuRNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 10920, 129-69 (1991).
5. Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. IlL 1954); Gagliomella
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 246 (D. Mass. 1954); Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See Fisher, supra note I, at 1264
& n.126. All three cases involved claims under double-indemnity provisions of life insurance policies that contained an exclusion for deaths resulting from acts of war; all three
courts held that the Korean conflict was a war despite the absence of a formal declaration
of war by Congress.
6. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). See Fisher, supra note I, at
1267 & n.l40. Fisher also quotes, in his discussion of the Korean War, a phrase from de
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1899), which involved the application of a treaty between the U.S. and France to a property dispute in the District of Columbia. See Fisher,
supra note I, at 1260 & n.I05.
7. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See Shane, supra note 2, at 1283 & n.ll.
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known national security cases. The list is familiar-the Steel Seizure case, 8 the Pentagon Papers case, 9 the Iranian hostage case, 10
and the Espionage Act cases arising out of World War 1, 11 just to
name a few. But these cases are exceptions to the pattern of making military and diplomatic policy without meaningful judicial
guidance.
One reason these cases are unusual is that there are various
procedural and jurisdictional obstacles to litigating over war powers
and foreign affairs. The first of these obstacles is standing. The
judicial power of the .United States encompasses only cases and
controversies. 12 Accordingly, neither the President nor Congress
may obtain advisory opuuons . on war and foreign affairs
questions. 13 Instead, an appropriate plaintiff who alleges a legally
cognizable injury (along with the requisite causation and redressability) must be found. 14 Most citizens will lack standing to contest the constitutionality of a military or diplomatic operaiion because they will be asserting a generalized grievance. That is the
lesson of Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 15
which rejected a challenge to the Vietnam War premised on the
susceptibility to undue executive branch influence of members of
Congress who were also members of the military reserve. Even
before that ruling, numerous lower courts rejected other suits filed
by citizens asserting a wide variety of objections to that conflict. 16
Of course, some individual plaintiffs might have standing. One
possibility is a member or group of members of Congress. Until
recently, the Supreme Court has managed to avoid deciding whether members of Congress have standing to litigate separation of
powers disputes against the executive branch. The Court finessed

8. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
9. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
10. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
II. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States,
249 u.s. 47 (1919).
12. See U.S. CaNST. art ill, § 2, cl. I.
13. This is not to suggest that courts always refrain from offering nonbinding comments on such issues in the course of dismissing cases on procedural or jurisdictional
grounds. See, e.g., Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. IJ41, IJ45-46 (D.D.C. 1990).
14. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41-42 (1976).
15. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
16. See, e.g., Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (lOth Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1042 (1970); Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
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that issue in Bowsher v. Synar, 17 which arose under a statute-the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act-that purported to confer standing on
any member of Congress. The Court concluded that an individual
plaintiff did have standing and therefore viewed resolution of the
congressional standing issue as unnecessary to disposition of the
case on the merits. The Court also avoided this question in Burke
v. Barnes/ 8 a case involving United States policy in Central America. I shall return to this case shortly.
In the last week of its most recent term, while this essay was
in press, the Court ruled that members of Congress did not have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto
Act. 19 The decision in Raines v. Byrcf0 rejected the argument
that this statute prevented individual members of Congress from
exercising their constitutional right and duty to vote on legislation.21 The reasoning in Raines raises questions about whether
members of Congress would have standing to litigate disputes over
war powers and foreign affairs. 22 The grievance in such instances
17. 478 u.s. 714, 721 (1986).
18. 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
19. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 691-692 (West Supp. 1997).
20. 65 U.S.L.W. 4705 (U.S. June 26, 1997).
21. Raines, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4708, 4709-10; see also id. at 4711 (Souter, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 4713 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
4713-14 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Court reached this conclusion even though the Line
Item Veto Act specifically authorized "[a]ny Member of Congress" to challenge the statute's constitutionality. 2 U.S.C.A. § 692(a)(l) (West Supp. 1997). An identical provision
appeared in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. See supra text accompanying note 17.
22. This is not the place for a detailed assessment of the Raines Court's reasoning.
Nevertheless, at least one aspect of that reasoning seems curious. The Court concluded
that the injury alleged by the plaintiffs in that case was not legally cognizable in substantial part because of "historical practice": in analogous interbranch confrontations "no suit
was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or power." Raines, 65
U.S.L.W. at 4710. Interestingly, all of the examples discussed in the opinion involved
alleged encroachments on the President; none involved claims that might have been asserted by members of Congress or implicated a statute purporting to confer standing on the
affected party. See supra note 21. The Court went on to say that "[i]t [never] occurred"
to the aggrieved chief executives in those separation of powers disputes to seek judicial
resolution of the issues. Raines, 65 U.S.L. W. at 4710. Although I believe that litigation is
generally an undesirable method for resolving disagreements between Congress and the
President, see infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text, the Court's conclusion that the
absence of litigation implies recognition that interbranch differences do not implicate legally cognizable harms does not follow. The President or members of Congress might decide
to eschew litigation for many reasons that have nothing to do with their perceptions about
the law of standing. They might fear that they will lose on the merits, that the judicia!
process (however expeditious) will take too long, or that they will appear weak or ineffectual by resorting to the courts rather than engaging in political self-help. See Jonathan
L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W.
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would be analogous to that in Raines-that executive action interfered with the members' right to vote on matters committed to
Congress rather than the President.
The Raines Court did not lay down a blanket rule precluding
congressional standing in all cases, however. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion strongly suggested that "legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat" a particular
policy would have standing to sue "on the ground that their votes
have been completely nullified." 23 On this reasoning, for example,
a majority of either house might have standing to challenge a
presidential troop deployment in violation of the War Powers
Resolution because the deployment prevented them from voting on
the question. 24
Beyond Raines, most of the law of congressional standing has
arisen in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which has recognized standing for members of
Congress in some cases/5 although hardly in all. 26 To put it
mildly, the concept of congressional standing has been controversial.27 Moreover, even in some cases where the D.C. Circuit has
found that a member of Congress has standing, that court has
declined to reach the merits under another-also controver-

REs. L. REV. 1595, 1598-1600 (1997).

Although this aspect of the Court's opinion is significant, accepting the majority's
interpretation of historical practice is not essential to the conclusion that the Raines plaintiffs Jacked standing. See Raines, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4711-12 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg,
J., concurring in the judgment).
23. Raines, 65 U.S.L.W. at 4709 (footnote omitted). The opinion also emphasized that
the case did not involve a situation in which the congressional plaintiffs had been
"singled out for specially unfavorable treatment." /d. at 4708 (citing with approval Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
24. Cf Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. ll41, 1150-51 (D.D.C. 1990) (deferring, on
ripeness grounds, a challenge to Operation Desert Shield because congressional plaintiffs
did not represent a majority of their colleagues); see infra notes 38-39 and accompanying
text. The Raines Court's reasoning might not require thai the plaintiffs include an actual
majority of either house (a showing that such a majority exists might suffice), but resolution of that question is beyond the scope of this essay.
25. See, e.g., Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Kline, 759
F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361
(1987); Vander iagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Mitchell v. Laird, 488
F.2d 6ll (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26. For a very recent example of a congressional-plaintiff case that was dismissed for
lack of standing, see Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
27. See, e.g., Barnes, 759 F.2d at 45-56 (Bork, J., dissenting); Moore v. United States
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 957-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
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sial-avoidance technique known as equitable discretion. Under this
doctrine, a court could decline to hear a case brought by a congressional plaintiff who satisfies Article III's standing
requirements. 28
Another plausible challenger to a military operation might be
an individual soldier subject to orders to report to a combat zone.
Such a plaintiff is likely to be able to assert a direct, personal
injury-exposure to hostile fire causing risk to life and limb in
violation of constitutional requirements. 29 It is unclear how many
such plaintiffs might exist. As Dean Ely has remarked, there are
powerful disincentives for members of the armed forces to bring
such a lawsuit: career officers would risk sacrificing their careers,
while enlisted personnel would be challenging authority in ways
that are fundamentally inconsistent with the values and ethos promoted by their training arJ.d in.doctrination. 30 But however unlikely
it might be that any particular member of the armed forces would
sue, a lawsuit requires only one plaintiff.
So let's suppose that a proper plaintiff can be found. A court
might still decline to resolve the merits on grounds of nonjusticiability (i.e., the political question doctrine). The political question
doctrine has had few scholarly defenders 31 and has been distinctiy

28. The concept of equitable discretion was proposed by then-Chief Judge Carl
McGowan of the D.C. Circuit, see Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New
Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981), and first applied in Riegle v. Federal Open Market
Comm., 656 F.2d 873, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1983). The concept generated withering criticism from some members of the D.C. Circuit. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 59-61
(Bork, J., dissenting); Moore, 733 F.2d at 961-64 (Scalia, J., concurring). For a thoughtful
critique, see Sophia C. Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss CongressionalPlaintiff Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1075 (1990).
29. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 29 (lst Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird,
429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.)
(rejecting challenge to legality of Vietnam War by active-duty servicemen without discussion of standing), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). Members of the active forces or of
the reserve who have not been ordered to a combat area might not have standing, however. See, e.g., Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972). And draftees might not
have standing to assert the illegality of a military action as a defense to a charge of
refusing to report for induction. See Rusk v. United States, 419 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir.
1969); United States v. Pratt, 412 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1012 (1971); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 982 (1960); United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323, 324 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967); United States v. Kirschke, 339 F. Supp. 834, 835 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
30. See ELY, supra note 4, at 56-57.
31. For representative criticism, see Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A
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out of favor in the Supreme Court lately. 32 But several challenges
to the Vietnam war foundered on this point, among them a number
brought by members of Congress33 as well as others by various
individuals, including members of the armed forces. 34 So did a
challenge to United States involvement in El Salvador during the
first Reagan administration. 35 To be sure, there are some cases in
which courts treated such claims as justiciable,36 but a plurality of
the Supreme Court relied upon the political question doctrine in
Goldwater v. Carter, 31 an important foreign policy case involving
the President's unilateral termination of a defense treaty with Taiwan. In short, there is now a sufficient body of precedent in the
war powers area that the justiciability problem must be taken seriously.
Two remaining procedural hurdles relate to the timing of
litigation, and both could pose major difficulties to anyone seeking
to invoke the judiciary in military or diplomatic disputes. The frrst
is ripeness-the problem of going to court too soon. That was the
difficulty in Del/urns v. Bush, 38 where an injunction was sought to
prevent the President from initiating hostilities against Iraq in what
was then known as Operation Desert Shield (and later as Operation
Desert Storm) without frrst securing a declaration of war from

Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHJ. L. REv. 643 (1989); Martin
H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 NW. U. L. REv. 1031
(1985). But see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVlEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 260-379 (1980) (arguing that the courts should treat separation of powers and
federalism disputes as nonjusticiable); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political
Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97 (1988).
32. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456-59
(1992); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
940-43 (1983); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The only recent case in which
the Court has relied upon the political question doctrine is Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224 (1993), which dealt with the procedures by which the Senate conducts impeachment trials.
33. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
34. See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Head v. Nixon,
342 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.), aft d mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Davi v. Laird,
318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970).
35. See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
36. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 33-34 (lst Cir. 1971);
37. 444 U.S. 996, 1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart
& Stevens, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
38. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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Congress. The district court held that the congressional plaintiffs
had standing, that the suit should not be dismissed on grounds of
equitable discretion, and that the dispute was justiciable, but concluded that the case was premature because a majority of Congress
had not yet acted. Accordingly, there was no interbranch confrontation and no need for judicial action. 39 I do not mean to suggest
that the analysis in Dellums is necessarily beyond criticism, 40 but
I do think that this precedent should serve as a warning that some
courts might find ripeness an appealing way to avoid resolving war
powers issues.
The other timing problem is mootness-the case might be
brought too late. That phenomenon is illustrated by Burke v.
Barnes, 41 to which I referred earlier in discussing congressional
standing. That case involved a challenge brought by members and
leaders from both sides of the aisle in the House of Representatives as well as by the Senate to President Reagan's purported
pocket veto of a bill conditioning continued United States aid to El
Salvador upon presidential certification of human rights improvements by the Salvadoran government. By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court-the district court had dismissed the case on
summary judgment but the D.C. Circuit reversed on the ground
that the pocket veto was ineffective-the appropriations bill to
which the certification provision had been attached expired by its
own terms. Accordingly, no legal controversy existed; the Court
ordered the suit dismissed as moot. Of course, not all such challenges will involve time-limited measures of this sort, but the often
stately pace of litigation should serve as a reminder that national
security cases can often be overtaken by events. 42
Certainly these procedural hurdles can be overcome, but let us
not exaggerate the prospects that the judiciary will be very aggres-

39. See id. at 1150 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment)).
40. See ELY, supra note 4, at 58-60.
41. 479 U.S. 361 (1987)
42. A good example of mootness requiring the dismissal of a case concerning national
security is the government's abortive effort to prevent publication of a magazine article
about the hydrogen bomb. An underground newspaper published essentially the same
information while the litigation was pending in the court of appeals, thereby prompting
the government to abandon its case. See Jonathan L. Entin, Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain and the First Amendment, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 538,
541 n.ll (1980) (discussing United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.O.
Wis.), dismissed as moot, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979)).
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sive in this area. The Supreme Court's track record in national
security cases has been notably deferential. Examples of this judicial deference abound. Consider the Espionage Act cases that arose
during World War 1, 43 the Japanese internment cases during World
War Il, 44 and such Cold War decisions as Dennis v. United
States. 45 As to Vietnam, the few courts that addressed the merits
of legal challenges to the war invariably upheld government policy.46 Indeed, even Dean Ely has a modest conception of the judicial role in this area, advocating no more than a judicial remand to
Congress for twenty days or so when troop deployments are at
issue. 47

n.
Let me turn now to my other main point-that we should be
grateful that the judiciary cannot resolve all the questions that
might arise in the war and foreign affairs area. If courts cannot
serve as the ultimate arbiter, these questions will have to be
worked out largely through political accommodation and negotiation. These accommodations and negotiations will necessarily reflect the differing constitutional views of each branch and of the
particular leaders of those branches at any given time. There is by
now a huge literature on the legitimacy of--even the necessity
for--constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial officers. 48
Particularly in the separation of powers disputes that are likely
to arise in this area, excessive reliance on the judicial process has
undesirable consequences. For one thing, courts have had difficulty
rendering consistent or principled decisions on questions of legisla-

43. See supra note II.
44. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
45. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). On the other hand, there were other Cold War era cases that
narrowed the government's authority to act in the name of national security. See, e.g.,
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
46. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird,
448 F.2d 1368, 1369-70 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972).
47. See ELY, supra note 4, at 54-67. Professor Koh urges a somewhat more expansive,
yet still limited, judicial role; his proposal contemplates enactment of a framework statute
authorizing suits by either concerned citizens acting as private attorneys general or members of Congress who are authorized to sue under the statute. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 181-84 (1990).
48. One of the other papers in this symposium contains an extensive bibliography. See
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First HalfCentury, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1451, 1465-66 n.37 (1997).
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tive-executive relationships. 49 For another, interbranch negotiations
recognize the political contingencies of many military and diplomatic disputes. 5° Finally, even if all procedural and jurisdictional
barriers discussed in Part I can be overcome, the pace of even
expedited judicial review is likely to be too slow to make much
difference in many fast-moving situations.51
Most significant, reliance upon the political process to resolve
questions about war powers and foreign affairs recognizes that an
effective government requires a degree of interbranch comity that is
inconsistent with frequent reliance upon the judiciary as referee. 52
Our system rests upon a complex set of unexpressed under-standings and an uncodified but shared sense of limits.53 Under-standings are unexpressed and the sense of limits is uncodified because
participants in the political process tend to appreciate the desirability of avoiding internecine conflict and because both structural and
institutional factors usually dampen the inevitable conflicts that do
a.-ise.s4
Judicial decisions, by contrast, raise the stakes of any particular conflict by clearly identifying winners and losers through formal
explanations that presumably will control similar disputes in the
future. The prospect of litigation encourages advocacy of extreme
positions for short-term advantage in court and attacks on the legitimacy or good faith of other views. 55

***
Let me be clear that in our system, with its commitment to
"uninhibited, robust, and wide open" debate on public issues,56 no
thoughtful observer can believe that "politics [is] bean bag."57
Nevertheless, we ought to recognize that even if war is too impor-

49. See Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 175, 186-212 (1990).
50. See Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 31, 51 (1991).
51. See ELY, supra note 4, at 57.
52. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 108-16 (1972).
53. See Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
371, 391 (1976).
54. See Entin, supra note 50, at 52.
55. !d. at 52-53; see also ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 18-22
(1989).
56. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
57. See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY: IN PEACE AND IN WAR xiii (1898).
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tant to be left to the generals, we usually have little choice but to
leave the subject largely to the politicians rather than to judges.
Whether or not we agree with everything that the principal papers
by Fisher and Shane have to say, we can be grateful that they
have reminded us of this basic fact.

